10 September 2001 was a relatively normal day. The Mayor of Campinas in Brazil, Antônio da Costa Santos was murdered as he drove home,[1] American rapper DJ Uncle Al was shot dead,[2] and Charles Ingram cheated his way to winning £1 million on the British quiz show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.[3] Two days later, the Twin Towers had been destroyed, 2,977 US citizens were dead, and the West was at war with radical Islam.[4] Just over fifteen years on, in 2016, the memories are still vivid and the scars have yet to heal. This period of time, however, provides the opportunity for analysis of the ‘Western response’ to the threat of radical Islam and distant dictators. This article charges that the events of 11 September, when the United States was attacked on home soil by radical Islamists al-Qaeda, acted as a catalyst for large-scale military intervention in the Middle East through the Bush administration’s ‘War on Terror’.[5]
It is first crucial to clarify potentially ambiguous terms and indistinct geographical zones and examples. The term ‘West’ generally refers to the United States-led military coalition of predominantly European and North American states which was used to tackle radical Islam and certain dictatorships in the Middle East and North Africa.[6] Furthermore, for a single article to attempt an analysis of all Twenty-First century Western military interventions would neither do the subject justice, nor provide any real detail. This article will therefore focus on the interventions in Iraq and Libya, and specifically concentrate on dictatorship removal. It will be argued that the Western policy of removing dictatorships has caused more problems than it has solved, with specific reference to the last fifteen years. This issue will be tackled thematically, assessing the political landscape before the military interventions, the military interventions themselves, and the situations which have developed as direct results of the military interventions.
Image courtesy of Executive Office of the President of the United States, © 2005, some rights reserved.
Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, as the former dictators of Iraq and Libya respectively, will now be examined in order to demonstrate the political environments which were toppled by Western military interventions. It must be noted, however, that this article does not condone the policies or actions of dictatorships, but merely seeks to provide a balanced argument for the benefit of the reader. As a British citizen during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, one was presented with an image of Saddam Hussein which stirred feelings of fear and dread which was, of course, used to rouse support for the British involvement in the invasion. Yet perspective is of prime importance in this instance. Felicia Okeke-Ibezim, for example, contends that Hussein was ‘hailed by Arabs from Palestine and Jordan as Arab Avenger who has fearlessly and single-handedly defied and challenged America and Israel’.[7] This opinion therefore lies in stark contrast with the Western portrayal of Hussein. Indeed, opposition to the eventual invasion of Iraq in 2003 was relatively widespread in Britain, involving high profile politicians such as the late Charles Kennedy and Jeremy Corbyn MP.[8] Although it is improbable that such opposition existed purely because a significant number of British people sympathised with Hussein, it is surely reasonable to argue that the opposition believed that a Western invasion was unnecessary.
The decision to invade is especially poignant today with the rise of even more extreme terrorist organisations, but this issue will be examined later on in the course of this article. Saddam Hussein, however, was not a saint by any means. Indeed, Smeulers and Grünfeld maintain that Saddam Hussein committed many atrocities, claiming that ‘[an] example of deliberate and planned mass killings was the attack on the Kurds by Saddam Hussein in 1988 during the war between Iran and Iraq … As a result of this attack, approximately 5,000 people died.’[9] This demonstrates the scale of death and destruction caused by Saddam Hussein in the relatively recent past. Smeulers and Grünfeld’s evidence, in particular, suggests that Hussein’s attacks were tantamount to ethnic cleansing or genocide in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), as a result of specifically targeting Kurds.[10]
Muammar Gaddafi is similar to Saddam Hussein insofar as he held the most powerful political and military office in Libya for a long period of time. Indeed, Gaddafi was the “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya” from 1969 until his deposition and murder in 2011.[11] This article maintains that it is important to conduct a full and thorough analysis of Gaddafi instead of merely jumping to the conclusions of various Western media outlets. In stark contrast to traditional views of Gaddafi, Kuperman charges that ‘the country’s first national survey after the war, conducted in late December 2011, reported that 54 per cent of respondents “strongly agree” that the country needs “a (single) strong Libyan leader” (Oxford Research International 2012: Q31A)’[12] The survey’s insinuation here is perhaps that the removal of Gaddafi was premature, ironically placing a wall between the country and the prospect of far-reaching democracy. Furthermore, for sake of a balanced argument, Senauth claims that:
‘‘Muammar Gaddafi was certainly an intelligent, resourceful man, but he did not receive a thorough education, apart from learning to read the Koran and his military training. In the country of Libya he had to prove himself and make himself a man of the people, but he was always afraid of losing power, and it was this that kept him alive, day after day’[13]
Senauth provides an insight into the nature of Gaddafi’s rule and hints at the paranoid feelings he worked hard to quash. The evidence on Gaddafi which has been utilised thus far depicts a rational man who was concerned about his hold on power, and a people who, after his deposition, desired many similar leadership qualities of the very man they had deposed.
Gaddafi, like Hussein however, also committed many atrocities. Hagan and Morse, for example, clarify the results of institutional investigations on Gaddafi’s brutalities, arguing that This evidence demonstrates that Gaddafi did indeed commit many acts of extreme violence. In addition, these acts were not isolated and were consistently carried out for the vast majority of Gaddafi’s dictatorship. Simons further details specific incidents of violence perpetrated by Gaddafi:
Gaddafi, like Hussein however, also committed many atrocities. Hagan and Morse, for example, clarify the results of institutional investigations on Gaddafi’s brutalities, arguing that ‘a report by the UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry on Libya (Human Rights Council 2012) notes a history of over four decades of grave human rights abuses under the former Gaddafi regime’[14] This evidence demonstrates that Gaddafi did indeed commit many acts of extreme violence. In addition, these acts were not isolated and were consistently carried out for the vast majority of Gaddafi’s dictatorship. Simons further details specific incidents of violence perpetrated by Gaddafi:
‘On 7th April 1977, the first anniversary of the 1976 student protest, there were further student demonstrations. Student leaders were arrested, tried and convicted. Two – Omar Dabboob and Mohammad Ben Saud – were hanged in public. Others were given long prison sentences. Such events focused attention on the rights of Libyan citizens under the law.’[15]
Simons’ detailed outline of a specific incident and the response of the Gaddafi regime clarifies the nature and tone of his dictatorship. Clearly Gaddafi succeeded in consolidating his hold on power, but carried out many serious human rights abuses in the process. Having conducted an analysis of the dictatorships of Hussein and Gaddafi, it is now crucial to examine the factors which led to their downfall.
In exploring the military interventions in Iraq and Libya, and the subsequent removal of each dictatorship, we must first investigate the motives of those leading the interventions. In attempting to examine the reasons for the interventions, international relations theories must be employed. The Hussein regime in Iraq was listed on George W. Bush’s famous “axis of evil” speech and a full-scale military invasion occurred in 2003.[16] The United States and the United Kingdom were leaders in this military intervention which arose as a result of the increased threat to Europe and North America posed by Hussein. The intervention was largely based on the premise that Iraq possessed “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMDs), posing a serious threat to human life. In the end, it was found that Iraq did not possess WMDs and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently issued an apology for faulty intelligence and ‘for some of the mistakes in planning and, certainly, our mistake in our understanding of what would happen once you removed the regime’.[17] Can the intervention be justified through other means? From a cosmopolitan perspective, humans have a duty to assist fellow humans in need, an idea proposed by individuals such as Immanuel Kant.[18] In this sense, the invasion of 2003 could be justified in terms of tackling a regime with a history of targeting, for example, the Kurds.
Yet regimes such as North Korea also commit horrific human rights abuses without serious physical repercussions. We must therefore delve deeper into the Iraq invasion. Cosmopolitanism is a useful tool of analysis, but the theory of offensive realism, proposing that states seek to accumulate as much power as possible to prevent the prospect of an attack by another state, is perhaps more suitable. Mercille, for example, makes the case that the valuable natural resource of oil was an important factor in the decision to invade Iraq, concluding that ‘Middle East oil now needs to be preserved for the Western world and denied to Russia and China’.[19] This approach makes sense when adequate attention to leadership backgrounds is given. The Bush family, for example, has a long history of involvement with oil ever since former President George H. W. Bush moved from Connecticut to Texas in order to take advantage of the oil boom in the 1940s and 1950s.[20] His son, President George W. Bush, unsuccessfully took on some of his businesses.[21] Of course, Vice President Dick Cheney was the CEO of the major oil company Halliburton before he could call his plane Air Force Two.[22] The offensive realist argument is compelling but it must, however, be remembered that it is merely theoretical and that this speculation is difficult, perhaps impossible, to supplement with direct and concrete fact.
In exploring the Western military intervention in Libya, it is of prime importance to give due respect to the historical context. It is crucial to consider the “Arab Spring” which occurred in 2011, ostensibly expanding the realms of democracy. Indeed, Menaldo contends that ‘in his justification of America’s intervention in Libya, he [Obama] mentioned American interests but was emphatic about the humanitarian basis for action’.[23] Obama’s case for military intervention here is questionable. Firstly, we must challenge the cosmopolitan view that was outlined with regard to Iraq. Why Libya and not another dictatorship? Furthermore, the assertion of Western dominance in North Africa and the Middle East is critical, and must be thoroughly investigated. It must also be remembered that Western air strikes caused considerable damage in Libya and assisted the rebel factions in toppling Gaddafi in 2011.[24]
Following the interventions in Iraq and Libya, transition councils were established and took over the running of each state. This took the form of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the National Transitional Council in Libya and neither lasted much more than fourteen months. This article charges that, considering the scale of each military intervention, this short period of time was insufficient to succeed in resolving the post-conflict problems in each state.[25] Indeed, these councils were tasked with filling a sizeable power vacuum following the removal of the dictators Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. George W. Bush optimistically exclaimed in 2013 that ‘the removal of Saddam Hussein was the right decision. America is more secure. The Iraqi people have a chance to live in a free society’,[26] but how accurate is this statement? The post-conflict resolution laid out by Western powers has unfortunately failed. Today a radical Islamic terrorist group, the Islamic State, is succeeding in recruiting European Muslims, killing Middle Eastern Christian minorities, and waging a war of civilisations against the West, with Byman arguing that ‘the Islamic State tries to govern in its own brutal way … The Islamic State offers a medieval form of law and order’.[27] English maintains that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq has been a force for instability and that ‘the escalating civil war and lack of legitimate rule in Iraq have created an enlarging power vacuum in the region’ which demonstrates the detrimental effects of military interventions in the twenty-first century.[28] Military intervention is surely legitimate in freeing foreign peoples from grave danger, but the manner in which the intervention is carried out, and how authority and government are restored, is crucial and has been lacking in the twenty-first century.
It is now possible to argue that a ‘second wave’ of strikes is being conducted by Western states in coalition in order to destroy the threat of radical Islam. Diamond claims that ‘the coalition occupation has left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there’,[29] thus prolonging military involvement in the region through continued and necessary airstrikes.[30] The Islamic State has gained territory from states in the Middle East and North Africa and is deemed a ‘global threat’[31] and a ‘grave threat’[32] by Gunaratna and Rasheed respectively. The radical Islamic militant group is carrying out terrorist attacks in states around the world, including France and Lebanon.[33] This group also commands territory in the north of Libya and is accompanied in this state by Ansar al-Sharia, another radical Islamic organisation. Indeed, ‘Ansar al-Sharia initially manifested as a revolutionary brigade during the 2011 Libyan revolution and gained prominence following the death of Muammar [Gaddafi]’,[34] demonstrating its connection to the removal of Gaddafi. Furthermore, ‘the most devastating attack attributed to Ansar al-Sharia was the attack conducted against the U.S consulate in Benghazi (northern Libya) on 11th September 2012 which resulted in the death of four American diplomats including U.S ambassador J. Christopher Stevens’,[35] which accurately details the capabilities of these terrorist groups to cause actual harm to, for example, diplomatic missions in states where there is a distinct lack of post-conflict resolution.
Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi clearly committed many grave crimes in their time as dictators of Iraq and Libya. This article has charged that their dictatorships, despite many humanitarian issues, provided a more stable pillar within the international system compared to the serious threat of Islamic extremism which reaches ever-further. The military interventions in Iraq and Libya by mostly Western coalitions and the consequent instability has caused more problems than it has solved. Is the world a safer place in 2016 than it was in 2000? No. Are military interventions helpful when no effective post-conflict plan is provided? No. Will the intervening powers of today learn from recent history in order to prevent further decay to the international system? The twenty-first century will surely provide us with the answer.
[1] ‘Assaltante confessa ter matado Toninho do PT Folha da Região (Araçatuba)’, (10th October, 2001), retrieved 2nd January, 2016.
[2] ‘Gunshot Wounds Kill DJ Uncle Al’, Sun Sentinel (11th September, 2001), retrieved 2nd January, 2016.
[3] ‘Major Charles Ingram has been found guilty of cheating his way to the top prize on “Who Wants to be a Millionaire?”’, BBC News (7th April, 2003), retrieved 2nd January, 2016.
[4] Matthew Morgan, The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 222.
[5] Paul Ruschmann and Alan Marzilli (eds.), The War on Terror (New York, NY: Chelsea House, 2005).
[6] Ellen Hallams, The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 63.
[7] Felicia Okeke-Ibezim, Saddam Hussein: The Legendary Dictator (New York, NY: Ekwike Books, 2006), p. 9.
[8] Andrew Murray and Lindsey German (eds.), Stop the War: The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement (London: Bookmarks, 2005).
[9] Alette Smeulers, Fred Grünfeld, International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights Violations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), p. 70.
[10] Samuel Totten and Paul Robert Bartrop (eds.), Dictionary of Genocide: M-Z (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008), p. 440.
[11] Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 63.
[12] Alan Kuperman, ‘NATO’s intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?’ in Aidan Hehir and Robert Murray (eds.), Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 210.
[13] Frank Senauth, The Making And The Revolution of Libya (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2013), p. 60.
[14] John Hagan and Jaimie Morse, ‘State Rape and the Crime of Genocide’ in Rosemary Gartner and Bill McCarthy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Gender, Sex, and Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 704.
[15] Geoff Simons, Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie (London: IB Tauris, 2003), p. 103.
[16] George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29th January 2002.
[17] ‘Tony Blair makes qualified apology for Iraq war ahead of Chilcot report’, The Guardian (25th October, 2015), retrieved 10th January, 2016.
[18] Immanuel Kant, H.S Reiss (ed.), H.B Nisbet (trans.), Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 45.
[19] Julien Mercille, ‘The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: the 2003 Iraq War’ (GeoJournal, 2010) 75, 4, p. 332.
[20] Marc Davis, George H. W. Bush (Mankato, MN: Capstone, 2002), p. 16.
[21] Eugene Wittkopf, Christopher Jones and Charles Kegley, Jr., American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (Boston, MA: Cengage, 2007), p. 499.
[22] Elaine Andrews, Dick Cheney: A Life in Public Service (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner, 2001), p. 36.
[23] Mark Menaldo, ‘Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy Leadership’ in Amílcar Antonio Barreto and Richard L. O’Bryant (eds.), American Identity in the Age of Obama (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 216.
[24] ‘Libya: Nato steps up air strikes on Tripoli’, BBC News (24th May, 2011), retrieved 17th January, 2016.
[25] Ronald Bruce St John, Libya: Continuity and Change (London: Routledge, 2015), p. xviii.
[26] George W. Bush interview with CNN’s John King (24th April, 2013).
[27] Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 175.
[28] Jacob English, ‘Regional Limits of American Power (Middle East)’ in Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet (eds.), From Superpower to Besieged Global Power (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008), p. 234.
[29] Larry Diamond, ‘What went wrong in Iraq’ (Foreign Affairs, 2004), 83, 5, p. 34.
[30] Ministry of Defence, ‘Update: air strikes in Iraq and Syria’ (19th May, 2015), via https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-air-strikes-in-iraq (retrieved 17th January, 2016.
[31] Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Community Engagement to Counter-Extremism’ in Jolene Jerard and Salim Mohamed Nasir (eds.), Resilience and Resolve: Communities against Terrorism (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), p. 79.
[32] Adil Rasheed, ISIS: Race to Armageddon (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2015), p. 119.
[33] ‘Recent Attacks Demonstrate Islamic State’s Ability to Both Inspire and Coordinate Terror’, The New York Times (14th January, 2016), retrieved 17th January, 2016.
[34] Annyssa Bellal (ed.), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 199.
[35] Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, The Global Jihad Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), p. 363.